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ARBITRATING ARBITRABILITY:
HOW THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
EMPOWERED THE ARBITRATOR AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE JUDGE AND THE
AVERAGE JOE
Jennifer Schulz*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses has grown exponentially. These clauses permeate
the economy: they appear in contracts with cell phone providers,
credit card companies, employers, and even nursing homes.1 In its
recent ruling in Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,2 the U.S.
Supreme Court created new obstacles for plaintiffs seeking to bring
claims to court when an arbitration agreement is involved. Prior to
this decision, the party seeking to compel arbitration bore the burden
of establishing that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate. Now the
party looking to go to court has the burden of proving the arbitration
agreement invalid—a seemingly impossible task given the Court’s
new requirements.
* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S. Architecture 2004, University of
Virginia. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for
their hard work on this Comment and the Supreme Court issue. I owe my gratitude to Professor
David Horton for his guidance and support in writing this Comment. Special thanks go to Elena
DeCoste Grieco, Kristin Olin, and Jeff Payne—for everything. Finally, I would like to thank my
family for all their support.
1. See Mark Thomsen, Companies Sneaky with Arbitration Clause, COULEE NEWS (Sept. 9,
2009, 12:00 AM), http://lacrossetribune.com/couleenews/news/opinion/article_2458168e-8c245098-945f-b26ed3594b21.html. In 2007, 40 percent of the 45 million members of the nonunion
workforce were working under employment contracts calling for arbitration. David Lewin,
Workplace ADR: What’s New and What Matters?, in ARBITRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE
FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 23, 27 (Stephen F. Befort & Patrick Halter eds., 2007).
Interestingly, consumers are never subject to mandatory pre-dispute binding arbitration outside of
the United States; in fact, the European Union would probably prohibit such a practice. EDWARD
BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 138–40 (2006).
2. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
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The arbitration agreement in Rent-a-Center included a provision
granting the arbitrator authority to decide all issues, including those
relating to the arbitration procedures and to the agreement’s validity.3
These issues are about the claim’s arbitrability—that is, whether the
parties agreed that a particular claim would be subject to arbitration.4
The ruling makes it even harder for the Average Joe to bring his case
before an impartial judge or a jury of his peers. For the average
American, whose only familiarity with the judicial process probably
comes from television shows like Law & Order, mandatory
arbitration is an unpleasant surprise. Most Americans’ fundamental
comprehension of the U.S. legal system includes the right to a jury of
their peers.
This Comment argues that the Court’s ruling will negatively
affect the rights of ordinary Americans and that Congress needs to
amend the eighty-six-year-old Federal Arbitration Act5 (FAA or “the
Act”)—or otherwise step in to prevent businesses from using their
superior bargaining power to take advantage of employees and
consumers.6 Part I of this Comment lays out the historical framework
of arbitration in the United States. Part II describes Rent-a-Center’s
facts and its path to the Supreme Court. Part III discusses the Court’s
holding and the reasoning behind it. Part IV analyzes the decision
and proposes that Congress amend the FAA.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT
ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE
In the early twentieth century, federal judges commonly treated
arbitration clauses as revocable at will7 and generally would not

3. Id. at 2777.
4. “Arbitrability generally deals with the question of whether parties have agreed to
arbitrate a dispute, the scope of that agreement, and the more ‘arcane’ question of who decides
those two issues.” Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L.
REV. 819, 828 (2003).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006).
6. Congress has not amended the FAA to keep up with the Court’s decisions. See Richard
A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2009).
7. See Andre V. Egle, Comment, Back to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.: To Challenge an Arbitration Agreement You Must Challenge the Arbitration
Agreement, 78 WASH. L. REV. 199, 202 (2003).
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order specific performance of arbitration agreements.8 In 1925,
Congress enacted what is now the FAA in response to the federal
courts’ reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements.9 Congress
indicated that the purpose of the FAA was to promote a federal
policy of encouraging arbitration, thereby helping businesses reduce
expense and delay when resolving disputes.10 To that end, the FAA
requires judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements.11 Through
section 2 of the FAA (“section 2”), Congress declared arbitration
contracts to be on “the same footing as other contracts.”12 After the
FAA passed, courts treated arbitration clauses as valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable unless there were some ground for revocation that
would apply to any contract.13 Section 2 thus prevented courts from
treating arbitration clauses as a special category of contracts subject
to a different set of rules.
Forty years after Congress passed the FAA, the Supreme Court
made its first major decision under the Act. In Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,14 the Supreme Court had to
decide “whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire
contract is to be resolved by the federal court, or . . . referred to the
arbitrators.”15 The Court read section 4 of the FAA (“section 4”) to
provide an “explicit answer”:
[T]he federal court is instructed [by section 4] to order
arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that the “making of
the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue.”
8. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 36. They would, however, award damages for breach.
Id.
9. Peter Feuille & Michael H. LeRoy, Where Is the New Enterprise Wheel? Judicial Review
of Employment Arbitration Awards, in ARBITRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE FOR A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 339, 348.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 349.
12. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96,
at 2 (1924)). Section 2 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
14. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
15. Id. at 402.
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Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause itself—an issue which goes to the
“making” of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court
may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language
does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud
in the inducement of the contract generally.16
The Court treated the arbitration clause at issue as though it were
separate from the “container” contract of which it was a part.17 This
interpretation confirmed the separability doctrine, a legal fiction that
the parties formed two contracts: the container contract and a second
contract consisting of just the arbitration clause.18 This second
contract often calls for arbitration of issues regarding the validity of
its container contract, thus granting power to the arbitrator to decide
the merits of whether the container contract is enforceable.19
Nearly thirty years later, the Court used a seemingly different
standard in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan:20 there, the
Court decided that an arbitrator—rather than a judge—would decide
whether the parties agreed to arbitration only where “clear and
unmistakable” evidence demonstrates that both parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability.21 The Court reasoned that the general
presumption in favor of arbitration should give way in cases in which
permitting an arbitrator to determine arbitrability might “too often
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would
have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.”22
16. Id. at 403–04.
17. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 109 (2007).
18. Id. Although some courts use the term “severability” instead of “separability,” the two
are basically interchangeable. For consistency, this Comment will use the term “separability.”
19. See id. at 109–10. According to Justice Black’s vigorous dissent, the FAA is clear in its
intent that an arbitration agreement should be enforced unless the court—not the arbitrator—finds
grounds for its revocation. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 412 (Black, J., dissenting).
20. 514 U.S. 938 (1995). The Court laid out the parties’ disagreements this way:
First, the Kaplans and First Options disagree about whether the Kaplans are personally
liable for [their company]’s debt to First Options. That disagreement makes up the
merits of the dispute. Second, they disagree about whether they agreed to arbitrate the
merits. That disagreement is about the arbitrability of the dispute. Third, they disagree
about who should have the primary power to decide the [arbitrability].
Id. at 942.
21. Id. at 944.
22. Id. at 945. The Court indicated that this difference was important because parties
contracting for arbitration have likely given some thought to the scope of arbitration but might
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Prior to Rent-a-Center, the most recent case on the issue of
arbitrability was Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.23 The
Court distinguished between a challenge to the arbitration agreement
specifically (which goes to the court) and a challenge to the contract
as a whole (which goes to the arbitrator).24 In Buckeye, the contracts’
identical arbitration provisions were separable under Prima Paint
and therefore enforceable apart from the remainder of the contracts,
even if the contracts as a whole were found to be void.25 The
plaintiffs should have specifically challenged the arbitration clause if
they wanted a court to hear their claims.
As a result of these decisions, when Rent-a-Center came before
the Court in 2010, there seemed to be two distinct methods of
determining arbitrability claims. Under Prima Paint and Buckeye, the
presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses requires the
plaintiff to expressly challenge the validity of the arbitration
agreement itself before a court will hear the case. First Options,
however, has the opposite presumption—one against arbitrating
arbitrability—and requires the court to determine whether the party
wishing to compel arbitration has shown clear and unmistakable
evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate. In Rent-a-Center, the
Court resolved the conflict created by these cases.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Antonio Jackson (“Jackson”), an African American man,
worked for Rent-a-Center West, Inc. (RAC) in Reno, Nevada.26 Like
many corporations, RAC required that each of its employees agree to

not realize the significance of having an arbitrator determine the scope of his own power. Id.
The Court further defined its exception to the general federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002). There, the Court
explained that when “questions of arbitrability” reference the gateway matter of whether the
parties actually agreed to arbitrate (e.g., whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration
clause), the questions go to the court. Id. at 83–84. In instances in which the parties would likely
expect the arbitrator to decide the issue, such as whether a claim has been waived or whether a
condition precedent to arbitration has been fulfilled, the question goes to the arbitrator. Id. at 84.
23. 546 U.S. 440 (2006). This was a class action suit against a payday lender for using
illegal practices that would render its agreements with the plaintiffs invalid. Id. at 443.
24. Id. at 444, 449.
25. Id. at 446.
26. Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶ 1, 3, Jackson v. Rent-a-Center West, Inc., No. 03:07CV-0050-LRH, 2007 WL 7030394 (D. Nev. June 7, 2007) [hereinafter Complaint].
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arbitrate all disputes,27 and Jackson signed RAC’s Mutual Agreement
to Arbitrate Claims (“the Agreement”) on the day he was hired.28 The
Agreement stated that RAC and Jackson consented to arbitrate all
past, present, and future claims, including discrimination claims, and
gave the arbitrator exclusive authority to resolve disputes regarding
the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of the
Agreement.29
During his employment with RAC, Jackson sought promotions
on multiple occasions, but RAC repeatedly denied him.30 RAC
instead promoted non–African American employees with less
seniority than Jackson.31 Jackson filed a complaint for racial
discrimination and retaliation in federal court.32 RAC moved to
dismiss the proceedings and compel arbitration, arguing that the
Agreement precluded him from pursuing his claims in court;33 in
response, Jackson argued that the Agreement was unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable.34 The district court granted RAC’s
motion:35 because Jackson had challenged the Agreement as a whole,
the question of arbitrability was for the arbitrator and not the court.36
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
arbitrability is for the court—not the arbitrator—to decide, even if
the contract delegates that determination to the arbitrator.37 The court
27. Declaration of Steven A. Spratt at ¶ 3, Rent-a-Center, 2007 WL 7030394 (No. 03:07CV-0050-LRH), 2010 WL 723713 at *27.
28. Respondent Antonio Jackson’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2,
Rent-a-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497).
29. Rent-a-Center, Inc. Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims, Exhibit 1 Attached to
Motion to Dismiss Proceedings and Compel Arbitration, Rent-a-Center, 2007 WL 7030394 (No.
3:07-CV-0050-LRH), 2010 WL 723713 at *29–34.
30. Complaint, supra note 26, at ¶¶ 5–6.
31. Id. at ¶ 6. Jackson was promoted eventually, only to be terminated two months later. Id.
at ¶ 11.
32. Id. at ¶¶ 14–20.
33. Motion to Dismiss Proceedings and Compel Arbitration at 2, Rent-a-Center, 2007 WL
7030394 (No. 03:07-CV-0050-LRH).
34. Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Attorney Fees at 2, Rent-a-Center,
2007 WL 7030394 (No. 03:07-CV-0050-LRH).
35. Rent-a-Center, 2007 WL 7030394, at *3. The court reasoned that the Agreement “clearly
and unmistakenly [sic] provides the arbitrator with the exclusive authority to decide whether the
Agreement to Arbitrate is enforceable.” Id. at *2.
36. Id.
37. Jackson v. Rent-a-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct.
2772 (2010).
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found it significant that the Agreement was not simply a clause
within a larger container contract; rather, it was a freestanding
agreement to arbitrate.38 The Ninth Circuit interpreted First Options
as requiring courts to apply “ordinary state-law principles” in
deciding whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.39
Therefore, when “a party challenges an arbitration agreement as
unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not meaningfully
assent to the agreement, the threshold question of unconscionability
is for the court.”40
III. THE COURT’S DECISION
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth
Circuit, holding that because Jackson did not challenge the specific
provision granting the arbitrator authority to resolve any dispute
regarding the Agreement’s enforceability, the Court had to treat that
provision as separable, rendering it valid and enforceable.41
Therefore, the arbitrator could determine arbitrability—and,
necessarily, his own jurisdiction.42 The majority43 framed the issue as
whether the sentence stating that the arbitrator has exclusive
authority to resolve disputes about the Agreement’s enforceability—
the “delegation provision”—was valid under section 2.44
Under section 2, a party may challenge the validity of an
arbitration agreement in two ways: either by specifically challenging
the validity of the agreement to arbitrate or by challenging the
contract as a whole.45 The Court stated that only the former allows a
court to determine an arbitration agreement’s enforceability and that
as a matter of federal law, an arbitration provision is separable.46
38. Id. at 915–16.
39. Id. at 917 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
40. Id.
41. Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010).
42. Id.
43. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,
wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 2774.
44. Id. at 2778 (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006)).
This section requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, unless
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” invalidate
the agreements. Id. at 2776 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687
(1996)). For the text of section 2, see supra note 12.
45. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2778.
46. Id. (citing Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445).
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Thus, a plaintiff must direct a challenge specifically at the agreement
to arbitrate for a court to intervene; if a party challenges another
contract provision or the contract as a whole, the court can enforce
an agreement to arbitrate.47 The Court further explained that it was of
no consequence that the entire contract was an arbitration agreement
(rather than a contract unrelated to arbitration that merely included
an arbitration clause)—the delegation provision was still separable
from the remainder of the arbitration agreement.48 Because Jackson
challenged the validity of the Agreement as a whole, an arbitrator,
not a judge, had to hear his claim.49
In one of his last written opinions, Justice Stevens dissented50
and claimed that the majority’s “breezy assertion that the subject
matter of the contract at issue—in this case, an arbitration agreement
and nothing more—‘makes no difference’ . . . [was] simply wrong.”51
He argued that certain issues—particularly those that the parties
would likely expect a court to decide—remain within the province of
judicial review even though the FAA allows parties to define the
scope of arbitration agreements.52 Thus when parties have included a
delegation provision, courts must decide whether that provision is
valid.53 Justice Stevens concluded that questions of arbitrability
should go to the arbitrator in only two circumstances: “(1) when the
parties have demonstrated, clearly and unmistakably, that it is their
intent to [send such questions to the arbitrator]; or (2) when the
validity of an arbitration agreement depends exclusively on the
validity of the [entire] substantive contract of which it is a part.”54
Justice Stevens, therefore, would have relied on First Options55
alone, as Jackson’s claim that the Agreement is unconscionable
shows that he did not clearly or unmistakably intend to allow the
arbitrator to determine arbitrability.56 By expanding the Prima Paint57
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2779.
49. Id.
50. He was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Id. at 2781 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
51. Id. at 2781–82.
52. Id. at 2782.
53. Id. at 2783.
54. Id. at 2784.
55. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
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rule,58 however, the majority required Jackson to use greater
specificity and challenge the exact sentence delegating such disputes
to the arbitrator,59 even though in Jackson’s case, “any challenge to
the contract itself [was] also, necessarily, a challenge to the
arbitration agreement. They [were] one and the same.”60
IV. HOW THE COURT GOT IT WRONG
To most Americans, the Court’s decision seems irrational—if a
party did not agree to an arbitration agreement as a whole, how could
he agree to any of the agreement’s provisions? There is a general
sense that “[i]f an agreement to arbitrate is unfair, the arbitrator
shouldn’t decide that question.”61 The Court’s decision is more than
simply illogical, however. It follows neither the FAA nor Congress’s
intent in enacting the FAA and Congress must act to reverse the
Court’s ever-increasing embrace of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration.62
A. The Decision Does Not Follow the FAA
The Court has “recast arbitration in an activist set of cases that
largely ignore careful legislative history and even the explicit words
of the FAA.”63 It is well settled that arbitration is a matter of
contract,64 and arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as
57. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.
58. It is interesting to note that this line of cases was not briefed by the parties or relied on
by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 2785. In fact, even RAC itself suggested that the Court should follow
First Options. Reply to Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Rent-a-Center, 130 S.
Ct. 2772 (No. 09-497) (“In this case, First Options is front and center.”).
59. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2787.
60. Id.
61. See Ameet Sachdev, High Court Sides with Businesses on Arbitration Case, CHI. TRIB.,
June 22, 2010, at C17 (quoting Karen Halverson Cross, professor at John Marshall Law School).
62. This Comment criticizes mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and
employment contexts. Although liberally applying the FAA has effectively cleared dockets,
consumer and employee claims constitute a disproportionate majority of the dismissed cases.
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair for Consumers?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 84
(2007) (statement of David S. Schwartz, University of Wisconsin Law School) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements].
63. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
64. In fact, this argument is used by those favoring the Court’s decision: a contract is an
exercise of choice by the parties, and those who agree to use arbitration should not be allowed to
go to court. Timothy Sandefur, Rent-a-Center v. Jackson: Supreme Court Upholds the Right to
Contract for Arbitration, PLF LIBERTY BLOG (June 21, 2010, 7:46 AM), http://plf.typepad.com/
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other contracts—but not more so.65 Consequently, parties can
certainly agree, as they often do, to resolve disputes through
arbitration; they can even agree to have the arbitrator rule on his or
her own jurisdiction. Jackson claimed, however, that forcing him to
argue his dispute in front of an arbitrator required him to abide by an
invalid contract. According to Prima Paint, Jackson needed only to
allege that he did not agree to the arbitration clause.66 The Court
required more of him, however, and in doing so, turned our
constitutional tradition of access to the courts on its head.67
1. The Making of the Arbitration Agreement Was in Issue
Unlike the Prima Paint contract—where the contract was a
detailed expression of the parties’ entire understanding, and the
agreement to arbitrate was only one clause68—the Rent-a-Center
agreement to arbitrate was the entire contract. As the dissent argued,
this fact should have made a difference in the Court’s analysis.69
Section 4 requires courts to hear disputes if the making of the
arbitration agreement is in issue.70 Jackson challenged the Agreement
as unconscionable, a finding that depends on the circumstances at the
plf/2010/06/rentacenter-v-jackson-supreme-court-upholds-the-right-to-contract-forarbitration.html. That, however, is exactly Jackson’s argument: he did not agree to arbitration.
Interestingly, although arbitration is a matter of contract, parties cannot contractually
customize the legal standard of review for an arbitration award. See infra note 78.
65. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). The
National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) argued that the rule creates a “federal
common law rule of self-enforcement that applies only to arbitration clauses and overrides the
state-law requirements applying to all other contracts,” thereby doing the opposite of the FAA’s
intent of putting arbitration clauses on the same footing as other contracts. Brief of National
Association of Consumer Advocates as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Rent-aCenter, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (No. 09-497) [hereinafter NACA Brief].
66. The Agreement was just one piece of Jackson’s employment contract with RAC, and
Jackson challenged only the Agreement. Respondent Antonio Jackson’s Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (No. 09-497).
67. See David H. Gans, Why the Supreme Court’s Decision in Rent-a-Center v. Jackson
Matters, TEXT & HIST. BLOG (June 22, 2010), http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/?p=1785.
68. Also, the contract in Prima Paint was between two businesses of arguably equal
bargaining power, not between an employer and an employee. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at
397–98.
69. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2782.
70. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Prior to the Rent-a-Center decision, some commentators suggested
that the only thing a party needed to do to put the “making” in issue was to invoke a contract
defense like unconscionability. David Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 8 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2010/04/02/horton.pdf.
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time of contract formation.71 Therefore, in Jackson’s case, the
“making of the agreement” was, in fact, in issue.72 Nevertheless, the
Court found that because Jackson did not specifically challenge the
delegation clause, the Agreement’s making was not in issue.73 This
decision abolishes section 4’s judicial review requirement and
essentially allows private parties to unilaterally alter substantive and
procedural rights without meaningful state oversight.74
2. It Is Unclear If a Plaintiff Can Ever Make the Required Showing
While section 2 indicates that arbitration clauses are “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable” unless separate grounds to revoke the
contract exist,75 the Court’s decision makes arbitration clauses
enforceable notwithstanding possible grounds for revocation. The
Court treated the Agreement between Jackson and RAC as if it had
two discrete parts: the first required arbitration of all disputes, and
the second required the arbitrator to decide any challenge to the
Agreement’s validity. Essentially, the Court claimed that the fiftyword delegation clause constituted a second agreement to which
Jackson knowingly and willingly agreed even if he did not agree to
the rest of the Agreement.
This conclusion is hard to understand: by separating an
agreement into a potential multitude of independent sentences—each
allegedly agreed to on its own—rather than treating it as a whole, the
Court read the FAA to “establish[] a near-bulletproof presumption of
validity for all arbitration clauses.”76 This reading requires a party
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
72. One could argue that unconscionability does not involve the making of the agreement:
unlike defenses such as duress that hinge on an inability to meaningfully assent to the making of
the contract, unconscionability prohibits unfairness.
73. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2779.
74. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 441 (2011). A
delegation clause uses section 2 to trump another part of the FAA, section 4. Id. at 484.
75. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
76. Justice Scalia exploited the principle of separability to find that sub-arbitration
agreements may be embedded within a larger arbitration agreement and that each of those
embedded agreements are separable. This means that an aggrieved party must challenge each subprovision directly and individually. See James M. Gaitis, Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson
and the Ongoing Assault on Party Autonomy, KARL BAYER BLOG (June 23, 2010),
http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=9732. Holding the delegation clause enforceable even if the
remainder of the arbitration agreement is unconscionable treats the agreement as a collection of
separately enforceable mini-agreements, each individually considered and assented to by the
parties. Justice Stevens’ dissent likened such a situation to a set of Russian nesting dolls. Rent-aCenter, 130 S. Ct. at 2786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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challenging a contract to prove that the delegation provision in and
of itself is revocable, but how can one ever offer such proof for a
single sentence taken out of context?77 By making it virtually
impossible for parties to prove a delegation clause’s invalidity, Renta-Center precludes parties from obtaining judicial review of
arbitration clauses alleged to be unfair or unconscionable.78
Companies now can (and likely will) insert similar language in
employment agreements, secure in the knowledge that if an
employee fails to challenge the delegation provision specifically, the
employee will be compelled to arbitrate.79 With this change, access to
the courts appears to be a privilege granted by an employer rather
than a constitutionally guaranteed right. The Average Joe will
increasingly find himself forced into arbitration even when he did not
knowingly relinquish his right to judicial review.
3. The FAA Was Not Meant for Employment Contracts
Not only does the Rent-a-Center Court’s decision not comply
with sections 2 or 4, but it also does not comport with the FAA’s
legislative history. Congress originally intended the FAA to protect
the contractual decisions of commercial parties with similar

77. Courts often invalidate arbitration clauses due to infringement of substantive rights, but a
delegation provision waives a procedural right (the right to have a judge hear the claim). Horton,
supra note 74, at 468. In order for a plaintiff to prove that a delegation provision infringes on a
substantive right, he must show not only that will it be harder for him to pursue his cause of
action but also that the arbitrator will enforce the delegation provision, and courts are unlikely to
engage in this amount of speculation. Id. Clearly, the additional showing a plaintiff must make
dramatically increases his or her burden, and even Justice Scalia seemed to concede that if
Jackson had challenged the “correct” part of the Agreement, he still probably would have lost.
See id. at 467.
78. See id. When a court reviews an arbitral award, the arbitrator’s decision is entitled to
deference even if that decision determines the validity of the agreement. BRUNET ET AL., supra
note 1, at 42. Thus, most awards survive judicial review. See Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 9, at
341–42. Professor David Horton describes delegation clauses like the one in the RAC Agreement
as “private procedural rulemaking” that “change arbitration from an alternative to litigation to a
parallel, private judicial system in which [companies] make the rules.” Horton, supra note 74, at
465.
As section 10 of the FAA provides four exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitral award
(fraud, arbitrator bias, arbitrator misconduct, and arbitrators exceeding their power), parties
cannot contract for any additional grounds for vacatur. See 9 U.S.C. § 10; Hall St. Assocs., LLC
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008).
79. See Horton, supra note 74, at 490–91. More disconcerting yet, plaintiffs may not even be
aware that their contracts include such delegation clauses. Id. at 490. Many contracts incorporate
by reference the rules of a major arbitral provider like the American Arbitration Association. Id.
Such rules often empower the arbitrator to rule on his or her own jurisdiction. Id.
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bargaining power and levels of sophistication.80 Indeed, the FAA’s
plain language demonstrates that Congress did not intend for it to
extend to employment contracts. Section 1 states that “nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.”81 At the time of the FAA’s enactment, these
were the only employment relationships subject to federal
jurisdiction.82 Between the early 1960s and the mid-1990s, however,
Congress passed a number of statutes regulating the workplace, and
between 1980 and 2005, federal litigation concerning employment
disputes increased 600 percent.83 Congress needs to amend the FAA
to reflect the federal government’s more prominent role in the
employment arena.
B. In Employment and Consumer Settings,
Courts Should Always Hear Arbitrability Challenges
By eliminating judges’ ability to strike down unconscionable
arbitration provisions, the Court has abolished an important check on
companies imposing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in order to
gain an unfair advantage in disputes. As a result, consumers and
employees now have more difficulty ensuring that their disputes with
companies and employers are fairly heard.84 A company has much to
gain and little to lose from inserting unconscionable provisions in
standard employment contracts that the Average Joe will, for all
intents and purposes, be forced to sign. Drafters can make mandatory
arbitration clauses self-enforcing merely by indicating that an
80. Historically, businesses did not enter into arbitration agreements with consumers, and the
legislative history of the FAA shows that Congress did not think the business-consumer setting
was an appropriate place for arbitration. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 127.
81. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
82. Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is It Fair and Voluntary?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 92
(2009) (statement of Cliff Palefsky, National Employment Lawyers Association) [hereinafter
Palefsky, Mandatory Binding Arbitration].
83. Lewin, supra note 1, at 26.
84. Brief of National Consumer Law Center and Consumer Action as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 12, Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No.
09-497) [hereinafter Brief of National Consumer Law Center]. For a discussion in support of
mandatory arbitration, see Jean Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631, 1653–58 (2005) (explaining that defenses include that employees and consumers
have better access to arbitration than they have to courts, and that arbitration on a post-dispute
basis is not feasible).
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arbitrator will decide challenges to the clause’s validity.85 Companies
will be “free to impose one-sided terms or select clearly biased
arbitrators with close ties to the company, secure in the knowledge
that any challenge to the fairness of arbitration will be decided by the
arbitrator whose very authority comes from the challenged
arbitration agreement.”86
Arbitration has traditionally been agreed to by two knowing
business entities of presumably comparable strength. Parties to
employment and consumer contracts, however, almost always have
unequal bargaining power.87 These employees and consumers are
often presented with take-it-or-leave-it contracts of adhesion that
leave little room for negotiation,88 and “judicial review for
unconscionability operate[d] as a sort of safety valve that ma[de]
arbitration of consumer and employment disputes palatable.”89
Judges could take the parties’ relative bargaining power into account
when deciding whether the parties had knowingly agreed to allow the
arbitrator to decide if arbitration should proceed. This safety valve
has been eliminated.

85. NACA Brief, supra note 65, at 4. NACA argued further that these clauses would be
“subject to no law whatsoever.” Id. at 6.
86. Deepak Gupta, Supreme Court Decides Rent-a-Center v. Jackson: Companies Can
Delegate Unconscionability Challenges to the Arbitrator, CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (June
21, 2010, 4:28 PM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2010/06/supreme-court-decidesrentacenter-v-jackson-companies-can-delegate-unconscionability-challenges-to-t.html.
87. Statutes often regulate contracts in these settings to prevent overreaching and unfair
terms precisely because businesses have a history of taking advantage of their superior bargaining
position. Schwartz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements, supra note 62, at 85; see NACA
Brief, supra note 65, at 7.
88. A recent survey of leading financial services and telecommunications firms found that
arbitration clauses appear in 77 percent of employment contracts and 93 percent of consumer
contracts. Horton, supra note 74, at 481 n.242. It is unlikely that so many people knowingly and
voluntarily gave up their right to go to court.
Tellingly, corporations avoid binding arbitration when it applies to them—only 11
percent of contracts between corporations have arbitration clauses. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS § 1.4 (Supp. 2006). For example, Congress passed the
Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001 because franchisees opposed
mandatory arbitration imposed on them by car manufacturers. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at
179. Ironically, although manufacturers cannot impose arbitration on franchisees because of
unequal bargaining power, franchisees still can (and do) impose arbitration on their customers. Id.
89. Aaron Bruhl, Allocating Power Between Courts and Arbitrators—And Why Scholars of
Federal Courts Should Care, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 22, 2010, 9:23 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/02/index.html.
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1. Unequal Bargaining Power Leads to Employees and
Consumers Alienating Their Rights Without Consent
It does not make sense to apply the same rules to contracts
between the Average Joe and his employer that apply to contracts
between two sophisticated business parties negotiating at arm’s
length.90 When the employee is presented with a boilerplate
employment contract that he must sign as a condition of getting
hired, it seems unlikely that the employee fairly agreed to arbitration
or that the employee even understood what he signed.91 This scenario
stands in stark contrast to a general commercial transaction between
two businesses, in which both parties are likely to have legal
representation during the negotiations, are likely to be familiar with
the contractual clauses, and are more likely to have equal bargaining
power. Judicial review must be available to ensure that
unsophisticated employees and consumers are treated fairly and are
not forced to participate in arbitration to which they did not
knowingly agree.92
By its very definition, arbitration eliminates certain rights of
employees and consumers.93 Form contracts such as the one Jackson
90. Companies are understandably eager to design their own dispute-resolution processes to
minimize exposure to liability and avoid public embarrassment. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at
182.
91. Indeed, “[i]n the real world, when a lower level employee is provided with a large pile of
documents . . . , the employee is almost never aware of the existence of that [arbitration] clause,
much less its meaning[,]” and he is likely reluctant to forego the job over a seemingly petty issue.
Id. at 323.
92. Lack of consent is not the only problem with mandatory employment and consumer
arbitration. Arbitrators’ decisions can be detrimental to the public, as they “place much less
pressure on companies to change their practices than court decisions because these decisions are
confidential, non-binding, and often unwritten.” Brief of National Consumer Law Center, supra
note 84, at 5. Our public system of justice is vital to deterring harmful conduct and fostering faith
in the justice system. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 182. Because arbitration proceedings are
private, they bypass public precedent and public exposure.
93. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 144. In addition to eliminating the right to trial,
arbitration almost certainly eliminates other rights, such as the right to appeal. Id. Further, the
arbitration clauses imposed on consumers and employees often contain provisions regarding
discovery, statutes of limitation, permissibility of damages, payment of arbitral fees and costs,
and the scope of judicial review. Horton, supra note 74, at 480–81. Moreover, arbitrators often
have structural incentives to rule in favor of the business. Dahlia Lithwick, Justice by the Hour:
The Supreme Court Tangles with Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, SLATE (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www.slate.com/id/2252001/.
Proponents suggest that arbitration provides employees with a forum that is cheaper,
quicker, and more accessible than a court; it also allows employers to reduce their disputeresolution costs and pass their savings on to the public. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 149–50.
However, arbitration can be quite expensive. Arbitrators charge $250 to $450 an hour, and
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signed require employees to give up constitutional rights as a
condition of getting a job.94 Such contracts include dense boilerplate
language that most people do not read and that is nonnegotiable even
if one did read it.95 For example, the Average Joe would not realize
that signing an employment contract waives his right to sue even if
he is the victim of a harm as egregious as discrimination. Jackson
argued that he did not agree to arbitration, yet he was required to
arbitrate that very issue. And even if he fully understood the rights
that RAC required him to give up, what choice did he have? The
Court should not have held him to the terms of the Agreement absent
a finding that he had clearly and unmistakably manifested consent. In
light of Rent-a-Center, drafters are now “quite literally
empower[ed] . . . to impose arbitration on others without their
consent.”96 It should not be so easy for people to unknowingly or
unwillingly give up their constitutional right to judicial redress.
In addition, because arbitrators’ decisions often do not include
explanations, arbitration deprives employees of this essential element
of justice.97 Furthermore, arbitrators are largely unregulated and need
not apply or even have knowledge of all the provisions of the
applicable law.98 In short, arbitration is much more than a simple
forum change that has no impact on substantive rights,99 and Rent-aarbitration proceedings can carry on for more than 100 hours. Unlike salaried public judges,
arbitrators have an incentive to drag the process out. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing
on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 69 (2007) (statement of Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, National Employment
Lawyers Association) [hereinafter Ventrell-Monsees, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007].
94. Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair for Consumers?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 11 (2007) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Public Justice) [hereinafter Bland, Mandatory
Binding Arbitration Agreements].
95. Lawrence Cunningham, Your (Vanishing) “Day in Court,” CONCURRING OPINIONS
(June 24, 2010, 1:54 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/06/your-vanishingday-in-court.html. Only a minute percentage of consumers read form agreements, and even fewer
actually understand what they have read. Sternlight, supra note 84, at 1648.
96. Horton, supra note 74, at 488; see Elizabeth A. Roma, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Contracts and the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 519, 529 (2004).
97. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the
New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 43 (2005). In addition, the lack of an explanation
makes it essentially impossible to challenge an arbitrator’s decision. Bland, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration Agreements, supra note 94, at 29.
98. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 8, 10; Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 9, at 378.
99. Palefsky, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 82, at 104. In fact, employees lose
the ultimate substantive right: the right to have the law enforced. Id.; see also Roma, supra note
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Center makes it harder for the Average Joe to seek justice in court to
enforce even his most fundamental rights.100
2. Violation of Employees’ and Consumers’ Due Process
Judicial review must be available to ensure the fairness and
integrity of arbitration proceedings, as arbitrators have strong
incentives to maximize their fees and generate more business for
themselves.101 There are now tens of thousands of arbitrators in the
United States, all with potential biases due to their significant
financial incentives to resolve the question of arbitrability in favor of
arbitration.102 Because the Rent-a-Center Court denied Jackson
access to the court system, an arbitrator will rule on “whether the
terms of the arbitration agreement are fair, in which case he gets to
decide the case (and get paid for doing so), or unconscionable, in
which case the matter goes back to court.”103 In this system of forprofit justice, the arbitrator cannot be a neutral decision maker with
respect to arbitrability, as one outcome results in his getting paid
while the other results in his losing business. Companies encourage
arbitration provisions because arbitrators almost always rule in favor
of those businesses:104 arbitrators who find in favor of business
96, at 531 (“Arbitrators do not have to receive training in the law; yet they have the important
responsibility of enforcing statutory rights.”).
100. Gans, supra note 67. Indeed, in Jackson’s case, his right to be free from racial
discrimination in the workplace was at issue. Congress specifically passed section 1981—the
statute on which Jackson based his claim—to ensure that courts would be open to victims of
discrimination. Elizabeth Wydra, Forced Arbitration: Proof That We Need a Supreme Court That
Understands How the Law Affects Ordinary Americans, ACSBLOG (Apr. 28, 2010, 2:52 PM),
http://www.acslaw.org/node/15990. One might ask if it is ever appropriate to refuse
discrimination victims access to the courts based on pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Id.
Arbitration’s secrecy may appeal to employers looking to avoid the adverse publicity
associated with public trials on discrimination claims. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. For
further discussion of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration of discrimination claims, see Policy
Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a
Condition of Employment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (July 10, 1997),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html.
101. See Brief of National Consumer Law Center, supra note 84, at 3, 19.
102. Gaitis, supra note 76. Even if arbitrators try to be impartial, it is hard to rule out the
possibility that they will at least subconsciously take their own paychecks into account when
determining a dispute’s arbitrability. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 155.
103. Alan B. Morrison, Rent-a-Center = Rent-a-Wreck, ACSBLOG (June 25, 2010, 3:51 PM),
http://www.acslaw.org/node/16426.
104. Editorial, Beware the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at 9. Arbitration companies
have strong incentives to favor corporations because ruling too frequently or too generously
against corporations may cause them to lose business, as corporations may blackball arbitrators
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interests will presumably have repeat customers—thereby generating
greater income. Indeed, arbitrators’ careers and livelihoods depend
on companies’ repeat business.105
Due process, however, requires a neutral decision maker. When,
for example, a judge has any financial interest in a case, he must
recuse himself regardless of whether the financial interest results in
actual bias.106 On the other hand, an arbitrator’s financial interest
nearly always aligns with that of the drafter of the agreement.107 This
bias—whether actual or only apparent—flies in the face of our
constitutional due process guarantees.
C. Congress Needs to Act
Congress wrote the FAA as “one-size-fits-all,” and courts have
interpreted it to reach employees even though employment contracts
differ from most negotiated deals.108 Some federal and state courts
are less enthusiastic than the Supreme Court about arbitration,
especially regarding consumer and employment contracts—yet they
cannot do anything about it.109 The Court’s pro-arbitration stance thus
leaves employees with little hope of successfully challenging
arbitration clauses. As the Court has expanded the scope of FAA
preemption through cases like Rent-a-Center, only the common law
of contracts remains to govern arbitration clauses.110 This is not
enough to protect the Average Joe, as the Court has made it clear that
challenging arbitration agreements will be very difficult. Therefore,
Congress must rewrite the rules.111
who rule against them. Bland, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements, supra note 94, at 17–
18.
105. Ventrell-Monsees, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, supra note 93, at 69. An employee
will likely only arbitrate one dispute, whereas a company may arbitrate many. BRUNET ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 145.
106. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
107. Brief of the American Association for Justice and AARP as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 37, Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497).
108. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 1, at 39.
109. Bruhl, supra note 89 (“Over the course of the last couple of decades the Supreme Court
has shut off most avenues for challenging arbitration agreements at the wholesale level—state law
cannot declare particular fields like consumer transactions off limits from arbitration, courts
cannot deem arbitration per se violative of public policy, etc. All such arguments are preempted
by the Federal Arbitration Act.”).
110. NACA Brief, supra note 65, at 7.
111. Congress has already proven its willingness to change arbitration procedures. The recent
Wall Street reform bill eliminated mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in mortgages and home
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Recently, Congress considered the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009, which would have excluded employment, consumer, franchise,
and civil rights disputes from the FAA’s scope.112 It also would have
taken away arbitrators’ ability to determine the validity and
enforceability of arbitration agreements in all cases.113 Simple
awareness of a risk that courts—not arbitrators—could end up
determining the fairness of arbitration agreements may be all that is
needed to prevent arbitration-clause drafters from overreaching.114
The bill’s opponents worried that these restrictions would reduce the
effectiveness of arbitration as a cost-effective remedy for commercial
disputes.115 However, the bill would not have eliminated the ability of
businesses to arbitrate disputes; it would have simply prevented
companies from using their unfair bargaining power to force
employees or consumers into arbitration. Furthermore, consumers or
employees still could have agreed to arbitrate a claim after a dispute
had arisen.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration should occur when circumstances warrant it—for
example, when parties to a contract clearly and unmistakably agree
to arbitrate, and both parties understand the consequences. At the
same time, courts must have the ability to protect weaker parties
from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration when the parties did not
clearly and unmistakably agree. Prior to Rent-a-Center, employees
had the right to go to court and ask judges to find agreements

equity loans and gave the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau the ability to preclude
arbitration of other consumer financial agreements as well. Stacy Johnson, Ready, Set . . . Sue!
Forced
Arbitration
Fading,
MONEY
TALKS
NEWS
(Aug.
18,
2010),
http://www.moneytalksnews.com/2010/08/18/ready-set-sue-forced-arbitration-fading.
112. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(b)(1)–(2) (2009). This bill
prohibits the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration entirely in these contexts (although postdispute agreements would still be valid). Less drastic options open to Congress would be to allow
mandatory pre-dispute resolution only when such pre-dispute agreements meet certain
requirements or allow states to regulate employment and consumer arbitration. For a proposal in
line with the former, see Bales & Irion, supra note 6, at 1091–92.
113. H.R. 1020 § 2(c).
114. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1488 (2008).
115. Andrew Ness, Changes Afoot—The Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, KLUWER
CONSTRUCTION BLOG (Mar. 19, 2010), http://kluwerconstructionblog.com/2010/03/19/changesafoot-%E2%80%93-the-proposed-arbitration-fairness-act/.
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unenforceable under section 2.116 This judicial review weeded out the
worst abuses while upholding most arbitration agreements.117 Now,
the judiciary has been relegated to rubber-stamping motions to
compel arbitration.118
Courts should not send disputes to arbitration unless parties have
formed enforceable contracts requiring arbitration of their disputes.
The Court’s decision in Rent-a-Center has eliminated a very
important check—judicial review—on mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in the types of contracts average Americans are
forced to sign every day. Thus, Congress needs to step in to protect
the Average Joe and restore the FAA to its original purpose of
encouraging and upholding arbitration clauses in contracts between
two willing parties.

116. Gupta, supra note 86.
117. Id.
118. Horton, supra note 70, at 2.

